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LIABILITY FOR INDUCING A CORPORATION
TO BREACH ITS CONTRACT
Alfred Avinst
1. THE PROTECTION OF THE CORPORATE VEIL
There is an absence of early case-law dealing with the liability of cor-
porate officers, directors, employees and stockholders for inducing their
own corporation to breach its contract. During the period when the
doctrine of Lumley v. Gye' was first accepted and applied in the United
States, courts apparently were not asked to do away with the protection
afforded by the corporate veil and thereby attach such liability to these
parties. Perhaps lawyers then felt it would be impossible to extend a
new tort whose limits had not yet been defined, and whose basis-except
where relief was granted to an employee who had been discharged,' or to
an employer whose employees had been persuaded to leave their jobs3
-was nebulous, if not non-existent, in light of the common law. More-
over, lawyers probably found little incentive to attach liability to cor-
porate officers, directors, employees or stockholders, since in most cases
it was much easier to recover from the corporation for breach of contract.
However, two factors arose which apparently influenced lawyers to
the extent that they sought to overcome the protection of the corporate
veil. The first of these was the extension of the doctrine of Lumley v.
Gye4 to include the inducement of the termination of a contract between
a corporation and a third person.' If a corporation exercised a legal right
to terminate its contract, it obviously would not be liable for breach of
contract. Hence, the other party to the contract stood without a remedy
unless those responsible for inducing the corporation to terminate its
contract could be held liable ex delito. Since, in the final analysis, the
corporate officers decided that the corporation should terminate its con-
tract, the disappointed party became interested in casting aside the cor-
porate veil in order to hold the officers liable.
The second factor was the rise of the close corporation as a familiar
form of business organization on the American economic scene. Corpora-
t See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 66, for biographical data.
1 2 El. & Bl. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
2 See 29 A.L.R. 532 (1924).
3 See 84 A.L.R. 69 (1933); 26 A.L.R.2d 1255, 1259 (1952). This action has now fallen
into disuse except where the acts committed were done with a design to compete unfairly
with the plaintiff.
4 Supra note 1.
5 Restatement, Torts § 766c (1938); 84 A.L.R. 43 (1933); 26 A.L.R.2d 1227 (1952);
Carpenter, "Interference with Contract Relations," 41 Harv. L. Rev. 728, 743 (1928); 7
Ore. L. Rev. 181, 301 (1928). See also, Avins, "Inducing the Termination of Contract," 24
Tenn. L. Rev. 1089 (1957).
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tions of this type at times were financially unable to respond in damages.
Also, they provided a vehicle for those officers who wished to injure the
other party to the contract by inducing a breach. Whether malicious
breach of contract might form the basis of a tort action was somewhat
doubtful; 6 hence, the disappointed party often turned to the more
familiar tort of inducing a breach of contract. It was here that the bar-
rier of the corporate veil proved a stumbling block.
2. DIRECTORS
It seems that among corporate officers, directors, employees and stock-
holders, those most likely to be shielded from liability for inducing a
breach of contract are the corporation's directors. The courts have
recognized that directors are vested with the widest powers to make cor-
porate policy, and that if they find that it is to the benefit of the corpora-
tion to breach its contract, they should not be held liable for inducing
the corporation to do so.' Of course, this assumes that such action was in
good faith" and for the benefit of the corporation.'
Thus, in Schuster v. Largman,° the directors (who were also majority
stockholders) of a close corporation induced the breach of an employ-
ment contract between the corporation and the plaintiff employee. In
disallowing the plaintiff's claim against the directors, the court advanced
the proposition that "in the exercise of their discretion and in acting on
their judgment for the benefit of their corporation, the directors should be
free from possible liability of that kind.""-
Another close corporation case illustrates this principle even more
clearly. In Application of Brookside Mills, 2 the defendant, who was the
corporation's director and secretary, was the person primarily responsible
for the management of the corporation's business. The plaintiff had
6 Compare Canister Co. v. National Can Corp., 96 F. Supp. 273 (D. Del. 1951)
with Schisgall v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 207 Misc. 224, 137 N.Y.S.2d 312 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1955), Note, 41 Cornell L.Q. 507 (1956).
7" Lukach v. Blair, 108 Misc. 20, 178 N.Y. Supp. 8 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1919), aff'd,
192 App. Div. 957, 182 N.Y. Supp. 935 (1st Dep't 1920).
8 Bostelmann v. Rheinstein, 268 App. Div. 1041, 52 N.Y.S.2d 281 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 294
N.Y. 822, 62 N.E.2d 245 (1945).
9 Moskowitz v. Feuer, 265 App. Div. 884, 38 N.Y.S.2d 242 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 291 N.Y.
568, 50 N.E.2d 659 (1943); Downtown Harvard Lunch Club v. Racso, Inc., 199 Misc.
618, 106 N.Y.S.2d 805 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1951). See Scammell & Nephew Ltd. v.
Hurley, (1929] 1 K.B. 419.
I' 318 Pa. 26, 178 AtI. 45 (1935).
11 Id. at 32, 178 Atl. at 47.
12 276 App. Div. 357, 94 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1st Dep't 1950). See also in accord, Finkelstein
v. Kesalp Realty Corp., 279 App. Div. 939, 111 N.Y.S.2d 282 (2d Dep't 1952); Horan v.
John F. Trommer, Inc., 124 N.Y.S.2d 217, 125 N.Y.S.2d 34 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1953),
aff'd, 283 App. Div. 774, 128 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1st Dep't 1954), Note, 30 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1554
(1955) (where the two defendant directors owned all of the stock); and see Rubin v.
M. S. W. Hotels, Inc., 275 App. Div. 829, 89 N.Y.S.2d 241 (1st Dep't 1949).
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contracted with the corporation to act as its general and exclusive selling
agent. Thereafter a dispute arose between the plaintiff and the defend-
ant over the prices of textiles manufactured by the corporation, and this
resulted in a great reduction of the merchandise orders procured by the
plaintiff's selling organization. The defendant then decided that it was
necessary for the corporation to seek other outlets for the sale of its
goods, and, hence, the corporation violated the terms of its contract. In
a suit brought against the defendant for inducing the breach of contract,
the court refused to find personal liability:
The decisions are clear that an officer or director of a corporation is not
personally liable to one who has contracted with the corporation on the
theory of inducing a breach of contract, merely due to the fact that, while
acting for the corporation, he has made decisions and taken steps that
resulted in the corporation's promise being broken.
To hold otherwise would be dangerous doctrine, and would subject
corporate officers and directors continually to liability on corporate con-
tracts and go far toward undermining the limitation of liability which is
one of the principal objects of corporations.
... The only way in which a personal advantage to . .. [the defendant]
... would be relevant to the issue ... would be that . . . [he was] ...
to derive a personal gain from causing this contract to be broken.13
In accord with the above view is Hicks v. Haight'4 wherein the plain-
tiff sought to hold the directors of a corporation, who were acting in
their representative capacity, liable for procuring a breach of contract by
the corporation. The court declared that it would be anomalous to hold
an agent liable for a tort committed within the scope of his authority
when liability did not attach to the principal for the same tort committed
on his behalf and presumably for his benefit. Moreover, the court stated
that as long as the plaintiff could recover from the corporation for breach
of contract, no reason existed for extending liability to the directors, and
that only if the corporation were financially insolvent should the directors
become personally liable.
It would seem that the above test is not particularly satisfactory. A
remedy for breach of contract does not preclude a tort remedy for induc-
ing the breach. 5 On the other hand, if the directors are not liable when
the corporation is solvent, should the fact of insolvency create a tort
which theretofore did not exist?
The immunity which the courts have granted to corporate directors
has been extended by one case to a situation where the defendant, as
13 276 App. Div. at 367-68, 94 N.Y.S.2d at 517-18.
14 171 Misc. 151, 11 N.Y.S.2d 912 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1939).
15 Restatement, Torts § 766 (1938). This applies even where the demand is liquidated.
See, for example, Moser v. Kremer, 192 Misc. 85, 80 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Sup. Ct., App. T. 1st
Dep't 1948).
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chairman of the board of directors, conspired with the corporation to
bring about a breach of contract and to divide the profits of the breach
between himself and the corporation.16 In denying recovery, the court
based its decision upon the principle that the corporate officer so inducing
the breach was a mere agent of "his master," the corporation."
However, the better rule, which apparently is followed by most courts,
does not grant absolute protection to corporate directors. In short, those
who act for their own benefit may be held personally liable. In Remy
Beverages, Inc. v. Myer,'8 the plaintiff had entered into a contract with a
corporation whereby the latter agreed to sell its carbonated beverages to
the plaintiff for exclusive resale in certaifi designated localities. The
directors induced the corporation to breach its contract, and the plaintiff
consequently lost its trade and went out of business. The corporation
subsequently moved into the designated localities and acquired the trade
which formerly belonged to the plaintiff. In the suit brought against the
corporation's directors, the court agreed with the general rule that direc-
tors may not be held personally liable for inducing their corporation to
breach its contract. It pointed out that the theory of such immunity
was that the directors act as agents of the corporation and, accordingly,
the whole transaction merely constitutes a breach on the part of the
corporation. (Of course, this theory begs the entire question, since
the very problem is whether directors who induce the corporation to
breach its contract act merely as its instruments or as independent tort-
feasors.) The court tacitly recognized the inadequacy of this theory
when it stated that such immunity was sound from a practical viewpoint;
if directors were held personally liable for inducing a breach of contract,
they might be deterred from acting upon their best judgment for the
interests of the corporation. In other words, sound business judgment
should not be hindered by fear of personal liability.
However, in the Remy Beverages case the directors were held per-
sonally liable under an exception to the general rule:
The exemption from personal responsibility which the mentioned rule
confers is not absolute; it is but a privilege; the immunity thus granted
rests primarily upon the privilege to advise, but the advice given must be
honest and the act done in good faith . . . [W]here the breach of the
contract is induced it must not be without reasonable justification or
excuse .... It would be an anomalous rule which would condemn one to
respond in damages for wantonly inducing a breach of contract and ap-
16 J. E. Brulastour, Inc. v. Wilmer & Vincent Corp., 63 N.Y.S.2d 54 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1946).
17 Id. at 57.
18 56 N.Y.S.2d 828 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County), aff'd, 269 App. Div. 1013, 59 N.Y.S.2d 371
(1st Dep't 1945).
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prove of such a wrongful act and immunize the actor from legal accounta-
bility therefor simply because in so doing he acted as an officer or direc-
tor of a corporation or in the capacity of an agent or servant.19
A somewhat extreme view was taken by the court in De Jetley Marks
v. Greenwood.20 As a defense the directors alleged they had good cause
to induce the company to breach its contract with the plaintiff, since the
latter's unwise purchases were forcing the corporation into debt. How-
ever, the court did not agree with this contention:
The good cause which excuses the procurement of a breach of contract
must be something more than a belief by the ... [directors] ... that the
company might become insolvent if the contract were not broken. To
allow such cause to be sufficient would be to excuse the procurement of a
breach where a breach itself could not be justified .... The justification
must . . . involve an action taken as a duty, not the mere protection of
defendants' own interest.2 '
While such language seemingly goes too far in attaching liability to
directors, it does indicate that this group does not have a complete
charter of immunity in inducing their corporation to breach its contract
with another.
3. CORPORATE OFFICERS
Corporate officers likewise enjoy a wide measure of immunity, and
once again public policy plays an important role. Since the officers hold
policy-making positions, their freedom of action aimed toward corporate
benefit should not be curtailed by fear of personal liability. However,
when the action is detrimental to the corporation and outside the scope
of corporate authority, immunity ceases to exist." In Burr v. American
National Theatre, one of the parties was a corporate officer who had
induced his corporation to breach its contract with the plaintiff. Even
though the complaint alleged this particular officer had acted for his own
personal interest, the court rafused to find personal liability because such
interest had not been adverse to the interests of the corporation.2 4
Similarly, it has been held that a willful refusal to pay an unliquidated
claim does not afford the basis for a separate and independent suit
against corporate officers who induce such action.25
19 Id. at 830. This case was followed in Ehrlich v. Alper, 145 N.Y.S.2d 252
(Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1955), aff'd, 1 App. Div. 2d 875, 149 N.Y.S.2d 562 (1st Dep't
1956) (Corporate directors held liable for inducing a breach to benefit themselves although
they committed no independent tort). Note, 31 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 497 (1956).
20 [1936] 1 All E.R. 863.
21 Id. at 873.
22 Morris v. Blume, 55 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1945). And see 26 A.LR.2d
1270 (1952).
23 103 N.Y.S.2d 589 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd, 278 App. Div. 908, 105 N.Y.S.2d
901 (1st Dep't 1951).
24 103 N.Y.S.2d at 592.
25 Terry v. Tachery, 272 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
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But where the corporate officer induces the breach to benefit himself or
to injure the other party to the contract, personal liability is imposed 6
The same is true where the corporate officer induces a breach of contract
which is against the best interests of the corporation. 7
Of course, the procuring of the breach of contract may be accompanied
by another independent tort. Thus, a corporate officer was held per-
sonally liable for inducing a breach of contract when he converted a
note retained by the corporation which the latter had agreed to pledge to
the plaintiff as collateral security for a debt.28 Similarly, in Dickerson v.
Dickerson,29 the court intimated that if the plaintiff had proved that the
corporation's president had induced his corporation to cancel its contract
with the plaintiff by falsely accusing the latter of stealing cattle, the
president could have been held personally liable for inducing the cancel-
lation. This case is particularly interesting because it involved a con-
tract which was subject to cancellation by either party, with or without
reason, upon ten days notice.
In summation, the cases seemingly stand for the proposition that a
corporate officer who acts for the benefit of the corporation will be free
from liability, but where corporate benefit is not present, the officer may
be required personally to respond in damages.
4. EMPLOYEES
Because an employee usually does not hold a policy-making position
in his corporation, his immunity against any action for inducing a breach
of contract is much narrower in scope than that of a director or officer.
Nevertheless, an employee is shielded from personal liability when he
induces a breach in good faith and for the benefit of the corporation. °
A leading case on this point is Said v. Butt.3 After the plaintiff had
criticized the management of a theatre owned by the corporation, he was
not allowed to purchase a ticket for the opening night of a play. He then
had a friend buy the ticket and when he appeared that night at the
theatre, the theatre manager ordered him ejected. The plaintiff failed in
his suit against the theatre manager for inducing a breach of contract;
the latter had acted within the scope of his authority and for the best
interest of the corporation.
26 Louis Kamm v. Flink, 113 N.J.L. 582, 175 At. 62 (1934). A similar case, although
the issue was not passed upon directly is Hornstein v. Podowitz, 254 N.Y. 443, 173 N.E.
674 (1930).
27 Rendich v. Preferred Mutual Fire Ins. Co. of Chenango County, 274 App. Div. 800,
79 N.Y.S.2d 501 (2d Dep't 1949).
28 Carpenter v. Williams, 41 Ga. App. 685, 154 S.E. 298 (1930).
29 197 La. 903, 2 So. 2d 643 (1941).
30 Greyhound Corp. v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 259 App. Div. 317, 19 N.Y.S.2d
239 (1st Dep't 1940).
31 [1920] L.R., 3 K.B. 497.
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• . . [T]he servant who causes the breach of his master's contract with a
third person ... is the alter ego of his master. His acts are in law the acts
of his employer. In such a case it is the master himself, by his agent,
breaking the contract he has made, and . . . an action against the agent
under the Lumley v. Gye principle must therefore fail .... 2
Another case on this point is Nathanson v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp.3 3 The plaintiff's contract with the corporation provided
for the payment of certain commissions, but the employees of the corpora-
tion induced it to breach its contract by selling the corporation's products
at a price too low for commissions to be paid. The plaintiff did not suc-
ceed in his suit against the employees because he did not allege that the
defendants derived any personal benefit.
Since a corporation can act only by its employees and since whatever
they do in relation to corporate business is corporate and not individual
action, the conspiracy charge fails. Any other rule would make it impos-
sible for corporate business to be carried on at all except at the peril that
every agent who advised concerning corporate action would be suable under
some such allegations as are made in this complaint.54
There remains the question as to what motive will be sufficient to
impose liability upon the employee for inducing the breach of contract,
or, to phrase the question in another manner, what motive will make the
employee's action one for his own benefit. A.S. Ranpell, Inc. v. Hyster
Co.3 5 is a recent case which illustrates the problem and indicates a pos-
sible solution. The plaintiff was a distributor of the defendant company
under a contract which either party could terminate at will; the com-
plaint alleged, inter alia, that the defendant's district sales manager
induced the defendant to terminate the contract, whereupon the defend-
ant took over the plaintiff's business and function. The motive behind
the manager's act was alleged to be his desire for advancement and
promotion in the defendant company. In dismissing the complaint, the
court stated:
The general rule is that an . .. employee of a corporation is immune
from personal tort liability for inducing breach by his firm of its obliga-
tions .... (citations omitted) Such act is presumed to be done in the interest
of his corporation even though it may have been marked with excess of zeal
or personal malice to plaintiff. Individual liability may, however, be im-
posed where his acts involve individual and separate torts distinguishable
from acts solely on his employer's behalf or where his acts are performed in
his own interest and adverse to that of his firm.36 (Emphasis added.)
32 Id. at 505-06.
33 189 Misc. 1024, 68 N.Y.S.2d 914 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1947).
34 Id. at 1030, 68 N.Y.S.2d at 919.
35 1 Misc. 2d 788, 148 N.Y.S.2d 102 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), modified and aff'd, 153
N.Y.S.2d 176 (1st Dep't 1956).
36 1 Misc. 2d at 792, 148 N.Y.S.2d at 106.
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The court also declared that "doing certain acts to secure promotion is
within the scope of one's employment," and distinguished this from
the situation where acts were done with the intent of acquiring personal
profit without any benefit accruing to the corporation.
Hence, the test of personal liability is whether or not the employee's
acts were intended to benefit the corporation. Another case which is in
accord with this test is Navarro v. Fiorita.37 The complaint alleged that
the corporation's general manager had maliciously removed products
from the corporation's warehouse, thereby depriving the plaintiff of his
commissions on export orders. Since the plaintiff was entitled to the com-
missions under an employment contract with the corporation, he brought
suit against the general manager for malicious interference with that
contract. In overruling the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court de-
clared that a cause of action will lie where an officer or employee induces
the corporation to violate a contractual obligation in bad faith and with
dishonesty of purpose or ulterior motive. The court thus recognized that
an employee has no charter of immunity when he uses the corporation
as a vehicle to serve his own ends.
The most frequent situation giving rise to liability in this area is where
an employee induces the corporation to discharge another employee.
Since the courts have recognized that such inducement is quite often
motivated by personal feelings, defendants have found but limited suc-
cess in pleading corporate immunity.38 Support for this position is found
in those cases which have held that an employee of a public agency may
maintain a suit against another employee or official of that agency who
procured his discharge, when the party who brought about the discharge
acted because of personal motives rather than the public benefit.39
Thus, in Vassardakis v. Parish,4" the court held that the complaint
stated a cause of action when it alleged that the general manager had
induced the corporation to discharge the plaintiff because of spite, ill-
will, vindictiveness, and solely to serve his own interests. Similarly,
Allison v. American Airlines41 held that if the defendant employee mis-
37 271 App. Div. 62, 62 N.Y.S.2d 730 (1st Dep't 1946), aff'd, 296 N.Y. 783, 71 N.E.2d
468 (1947), Note, 46 Colum. L. Rev. 1039 (1946). This case was followed in Buckley v.
112 Central Park South, Inc., 285 App. Div. 331, 136 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1st Dep't 1954), Notes,
30 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1555 (1955); 31 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 497 (1956).
38 See McGurk v. Cronemwett, 199 Mass. 457, 85 N.E. 576 (1908), where the court
held that an action lay against an officer of the corporation for inducing the corporation
to discharge an employee.
39 See, Graham v. Hubert, 58 Ga. App. 19, 197 S.E. 335 (1938); Bullock v. School Dist.
241, 75 Idaho 304, 272 P.2d 292 (1954); Caverno v. Fellows, 300 Mass. 331, 15 N.E.2d
483 (1938).
40 36 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). Accord, Weinstein v. Banks, 279 App. Div. 764,
109 N.Y.S.2d 185 (2d Dep't 1951).
41 112 F. Supp. 37 (D. Okla. 1953).
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represented certain facts to induce the corporation to discharge the plain-
tiff and because of such misrepresentations the corporation did discharge
the plaintiff, the latter could recover both compensatory and punitive
damages from the employee for procuring his discharge. However, the
court also stated that if the employee acted for the benefit of the corpora-
tion, no cause of action would exist.' Hence, the rule appears to be that
an employee will not be personally liable if he induces the corporatioi to
discharge a fellow employee solely for the corporation's benefit or in the
course of his duties.
5. STOCKHOLDERS
In considering the liability of corporate officers, directors, employees
and stockholders for inducing their own corporation to breach its con-
tract, it should be noted that stockholders face the greatest danger inso-
far as liability is concerned. Of course, this group cannot be described
as the alter ego of the corporation, because the latter acts through its
agents but not through its stockholders. Hence, the theory of immunity
for this group seems to be that stockholders act to protect their own
interests.4 3 Support for this theory is found in the cases which have held
that a person may speak out to protect his own interests,4. or give dis-
interested advice4 5 (especially where there is a confidential relation-
ship46), even though he thereby induces a breach of contract.
This rule is illustrated by Petit v. Cuneo.Y The defendant held a large
block of stock in a corporation which had secured the services of the
plaintiff under an employment contract providing for compensation to
be fixed by the corporation's executive committee. After the committee
had decided upon the amount to be paid the plaintiff, they were influ-
enced by the defendant to reduce the compensation. The plaintiff there-
upon brought suit against the defendant for the difference. Since the
directors are elected to represent the stockholders, who are the corpora-
tion's real owners and whose money is involved, the court held that a
stockholder can influence the action of the directors with respect to the
amount to be paid for services rendered to the corporation.
42 Id. at 38.
43 Restatement, Torts § 769 (1938):
One who has a financial interest in the business of another is privileged purposely to
cause him not to enter into or continue a relation with a third person in that business
if the actor (a) does not employ improper means, and (b) acts to protect his interest
from being prejudiced by the relation.
Comment (a) illustrates this rule with the cases of a partner or stockholder.
44 Owens v. Automotive Engineers, Inc., 208 Okla. 251, 255 P.2d 240 (1953).
45 Arnold v. Moffitt, 30 R.I. 310, 75 Atl. 502 (1910). And see Note, 56 L.Q. Rev.
303 (1940).
46 Lawless v. Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers of America, 300 P.2d
159 (Cal. App. 1956). And see Restatement, Torts § 770.
47 290 Il. App. 16, 7 N.E.2d 774 (1937).
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This rule is especially applicable to a close corporation,48 since any
loss to the corporation directly affects the stockholders who have a
greater financial interest in the detailed activities of the corporation.
Here it would seem much easier to find a legitimate personal interest by
the individual stockholders, for there is greater reason to identify the
stockholders with the close corporation than with the public issue cor-
poration.
A case which appears to lend some support to this position is Braden
v. Perkins,49 where the court held that a partner could not be held liable
ex delicto for inducing a breach of contract by his partnership. The court
reasoned that his duty to the other partners gave him an absolute right
to interfere with the contract, and that such interference was privileged
and justifiable. On the other hand, Phillips & Benjamin Co. v. Ratner"°
held that the fact that a manufacturer had a contract claim against its
sales agent's subsidiary would not preclude an additional claim against
the sales agent for inducing a breach of contract where the agent had
instructed its subsidiary not to pay the debt. This case represents an
extreme view of a stockholder's liability for inducing the corporation to
breach its contract. It might seriously impede the operations of a close
corporation, especially if extended to cases of individual stockholders
and one-man corporations.
Of course, even in close corporations liability will be imposed upon a
stockholder who induces a breach of contract, not to protect his own
interests, but to injure another. In Pennington Trap Rock Corp. v.
Pennington Quarry Co.,," the individual defendant was the sole owner
of the corporate defendant's stock; he caused a violation of the corporate
defendant's lease with the plaintiff by failing to keep a quarry and certain
machinery in good repair. The individual defendant was held personally
liable on the ground that he had maliciously and unjustifiably ordered
the tort to be committed.-2 In accord with this decision is Morgan v.
Andrews,8 3 wherein the defendant stockholder, who was also the corpora-
tion's factory manager, maliciously and without good cause persuaded
the corporation to reject the plaintiff's machine. There is sound reason
for holding stockholders liable in such cases. The stockholders were not
acting to protect their own interests but rather were giving expression
48 Vaporate Co. v. Peerless Film Processing Corp., 77 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1947).
49 174 Misc. 885, 22 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1940).
50 206 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1953).
51 22 N.J. Misc. 318, 38 A.2d 869 (1944). See also the concurring opinion of Judge
Clark in Republic of Italy v. DeAngelis, 206 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1953) at 126.
52 See also Lien v. Northwestern Engineering Co., 73 S.D. 84, 39 N.W.2d 483 (1949).
53 107 Mich. 33, 64 N.W. 869 (1895). And see, for a similar result, Aalfo Co. v. Kinney,
105 N.J.L. 345, 144 AUt. 715 (1929).
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to their personal feelings against the particular plaintiffs. There is no
public policy which protects a person who wishes to injure another; in
such cases protection by means of the corporate veil is not justified.
6. CONCLUSION
Officers, directors, agents or employees who have an interest in the
activities of a corporation or the duty to advise or direct such activities
should be immune from liability for inducing the corporation to breach
its contract, assuming their actions are in pursuit of such interests or
duties. Public policy demands that so long as these parties act in good
faith and for the best interests of their corporation, they should not be
deterred by the danger of personal liability. Any other position would
make the limited liability of a corporation somewhat meaningless.
On the other hand, the corporate veil should not stand as a means of
protection for those who choose to employ corporate power to serve their
own ends. Tort liability should be swiftly imposed whenever an officer,
director, employee or stockholder induces a breach of contract for private
benefit or to satisfy personal feelings against a third party. The limited
liability of the corporate charter was granted for corporate purposes.
Where such purposes no longer exist, there should be no limited liability.
1957]
